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Nietzsche assesses values, moralities, religions, cultures, and persons in terms of health. He
argues that we should reject those that are unhealthy and develop healthier alternatives. But
what is Nietzsche’s conception of health, and why should it carry such normative force? In this
paper I argue for reading Nietzsche’s concept of health as the overall ability to meet the
demands of one’s motivational landscape. I show that, unlike other interpretations, this
reading accounts for his rejection of particular features of a prevailing, then as now, model of
health; for his association of health with strength and with psychic unity; and for his claim that
health is compatible with, and can even be enhanced by, functional impairments such as those




In the Preface to GM, Nietzsche says his task is to address the following questions:2
[U]nder which conditions did humanity invent for itself those judgments good and
evil? Have they inhibited or fostered human  ourishing [Gedeihen] up to now? Are
they an indication of a state of crisis, of impoverishment, of a degeneration of life? Or,
conversely, is fullness, strength [Kraft], the will of life, its courage, its con dence, its
future revealed in them? (GM P.3)3
In the third essay, he answers,4
The ascetic priest [who ushered in the judgments in question] has corrupted health of
the soul everywhere he has come to rule. (GM III.22)
Clearly, the standard by which Nietzsche is judging “health of the soul” or “human  ourishing” is
pivotal to his criticism of conventional morality in GM. Indeed, Nietzsche uses health again and again
4 Cf. HH I.35, 50, 141, 243, 251, 590; HH WS.174; D 52, 269, 424; BGE 62; A 3, 17, 22, 30; TI Morality.
3 Translations of Nietzsche are mine based on Nietzsche (2009).
2 I use these abbreviations of Nietzsche’s works:
A The Antichrist




GM Toward a Genealogy of Morality (I-III)
GS The Gay Science
HH Human, All-Too-Human (I, II, WS)
TI Twilight of the Idols
UM Untimely Meditations (I-IV)
[Year] [#] Unpublished notebooks (per Nietzsche 2009),
and this of Schopenhauer’s:
WWR The World as Will and Representation (I-II).
1 This content of this paper owes much to extensive written feedback from Paul Katsafanas, John Richardson,
Colleen Cressman, Justin Remhof, and Kaitlyn Creasy and to the participants in Remhof’s virtual Nietzsche Workshop,
including: Rebecca Bamford, Jessica Berry, Ken Gemes, Paul Loeb, Allison Merrick, Matthew Meyer, Mark Migotti, and
Alexander Prescott-Couch. I also want to thank Daniel Dahlstrom, C. Allen Speight, and two anonymous reviewers for
their varied and helpful input on versions of this paper.
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throughout his corpus as an evaluative criterion: values and ideals, persons and groups, institutions and
cultures are now held up and now cast down on the basis of their being, causing, or signifying good
and poor health respectively.5
Readers, however, will search in vain for clear and consistent statements of what health means
for Nietzsche. And students will be disappointed by the lack of scholarly consensus, and relative6
dearth of scholarly attention, on this issue. This paper aims to clarify exactly what Nietzsche means by7
health by the late 1880s. My account contrasts on important points with recent scholarship. It draws
on Nietzsche’s historical context and recent work in philosophy of medicine and of disability.
Throughout I build an interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of health that sheds light on why he held
the view he did and why we might, too. I am unable, here, to develop a comprehensive reading of
Nietzsche criticism of morality in GM or to explore the relation of health to Nietzsche’s other
evaluative criteria. But in clarifying Nietzsche’s concept of health this paper should substantially
contribute to those tasks.
My argument proceeds in four main parts. First (§2) I present a foil for Nietzsche’s concept of
health: a functionalist concept of health that prevailed then as now. According to this account of
health, to be healthy is to be in a state where one’s physical and mental processes function at least as
e ciently as normal at promoting one’s survival and reproduction. The second step in my argument is
to show why Nietzsche rejects this view. I discuss two reasons he gives, which serve as two desiderata for
interpreting Nietzsche’s positive concept of health: (§3) the ideal human condition is not merely that
of surviving and reproducing, and (§4) an impairment that diminishes the health of one person does
7 Noteworthy exceptions include Huddleston (2017); Richardson (2009, 2015); Reginster (2013).
6 Two apparent exceptions are UM II.1 (1874) and HH I.224 (1878). They are, however, not fully consistent with
each other much less the works of the late 1880s discussed in detail below.
5 See UM II.1; GS 340; A 7, 14.
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not necessarily diminish that of another. My third step provides two further desiderata: Nietzsche
closely associates health both with strength (§5) and with expression of one’s drives or instincts (§6).
My fourth and  nal step is (§§7-10) to show how we can account for all these desiderata by interpreting
Nietzsche’s concept of health as the condition of being able to meet the demands that our basic
motivational dispositions place upon us.
§2
As I argue below, Nietzsche employed a uni ed notion of human health—encompassing both
psychological and physiological factors. Contra some interpreters, he typically uses health literally,8
seeing states of a air measured by his use of health as identical to those of concern to medical
professionals. This is suggested by his claims to have insight into the constitution of health on the basis
of his lifelong struggles with illness (more on this below). It’s implied by his call on medical researchers
to continue his project at the end of GM I. Given that he uses health literally, I begin by considering how
other medical theorists conceived of health in his day.
Health was conceived then quite similarly to the model of health prevailing in recent
philosophy of medicine. Simplifying somewhat, the view can be described this way, which I call
Functionalist-Health or F-Health:9
(Ends) All living organisms are naturally directed toward the ends of survival and
reproduction.
(Functions) Processes within an organism perform functions insofar as they regularly
causally contribute to the organism’s tendency to realize its natural ends.
9 Cf. Hausman (2011); Boorse (1997, 1977).
8 Richardson (2004); Leiter (2002); Moore (2002).
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(Pathology) When processes depart from their normal (level of) function they are
dysfunctional or pathological.
(F-Health) An organism is healthy to the extent that it is free of pathology.
According to F-Health, for a person to be healthy is for her to be in a psychological and physical state at
least normally well-suited to the performance of those bodily and mental functions that typically
contribute to a human’s survival and reproduction. Avoiding overly technical examples, I am healthy
insofar as my nasal passages allow air ow at least as well, my pancreas regulates my insulin and glucagon
at least as e ciently, and my so-called “stress-” or “ ght/ ight-response” matches my circadian rhythm
and life-circumstances at least as well as the normal human. To the extent that any of these systems
function below a normal threshold—perhaps that typical of someone my age in comparable
circumstances —it is pathological and I am ill (e.g. nasally congested, prediabetic, or su ering from10
generalized anxiety disorder). To emphasize, all of these claims are comparative: one’s health is a matter
of degree.
The most delicate and controversial aspect of F-Health—then as now—is how to specify the
threshold of normality below which a functional level is deemed pathological. I lack the space to11
review the debates here, and their intricacies don’t shed light on Nietzsche’s objections to F-Health.
What makes a system’s function sub- rather than merely non-normal is that it contributes less e ciently
to the organism’s overall survival and/or reproduction. Of course, even Nietzsche’s contemporaries
appreciated the fact that living organisms are highly complex and, accordingly, that the contribution
one system makes to survival and reproduction is not direct; there is no linear relation between the rate
11 Since the 19th century e orts have been made to specify this level statistically: see Canguilhem ([1966] 1989) on
the history; Hausman (2011) and Boorse (1997) for recent e orts. Since at least mid-20th century, philosophers of medicine
have debated whether such a threshold can be speci ed without making recourse to prudential or social norms: see
Canguilhem ([1966] 1989); Nordenfelt (2013a, 1995); Kingma (2016, 2010, 2007).
10 This is, roughly, how Boorse (1997) proposes to understand normality.
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of air ow allowed by my nasal passages and my overall health since there are many other factors
interacting to enable my survival. This is part of why functionalist-health is de ned negatively, as the
absence of disease(s), rather than positively, as the existence of high function(s).
As I discuss in Dunkle (2018), the thesis, Ends, had near consensus in Nietzsche’s day and,
indeed, long before. One  nds it clearly espoused in the work of Kant, the German Idealists, and
Schopenhauer; in J.S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and William Rolph each of whom Nietzsche read
carefully; and in the groundbreaking physiological work of the French celebrity-researcher Claude
Bernard, whom Nietzsche also read. Though Darwin’s work permanently altered the way in which12
we conceive the ontology of Ends (and so Functions), there remains to this day agreement on the
general content.
While Ends was a long prevailing view, Pathology was an innovation in the 19th century.
Georges Canguilhem ([1966] 1989), in his well-known historical discussion of the subject, attributes
this innovation partly to Bernard. Pathology is crucial for F-Health to cohere, since without it F-Health
would collapse into the untenable view that the more e ciently a system functions the healthier one is.
Again, this would problematically imply that having massive nasal passages makes one ipso facto13
healthier than having typical passages. It’s noteworthy that Nietzsche was taken by Bernard’s ideas on
health, quoting them with approval in his late notebooks when drafting his own ideas on health and
sickness.14
Schopenhauer, who studied physiology and human anatomy at Göttingen and Berlin, o ers a
representative version of F-Health with which Nietzsche would have been familiar. In his discussions
14 1888 14[65].
13 Though Hausman (2015, 2011) proposes a workaround to this problem which amounts to giving up on
de ning health unambiguously.
12 See Kant ([1790] 2000: 5:371); Hegel (1970: 219-20/§335z); Bernard ([1865] 1957: 64, 92-3); Spencer ([1879]
1882: 14-9). Rolph (1884: 97) identi es and criticizes it in very similar ways to Nietzsche.
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of “internal purposiveness” (innere Zweckmäßigkeit) in the organic realm in WWR, Schopenhauer
de nes internal purposiveness as “an agreement [Uebereinstimmung] between all the parts of an
individual organism which are arranged so that the maintenance of the organism itself as well as its
genus results, and thus presents itself as the goal [Zweck] of the arrangement” (WWR I: 184). From15
this account of Functions in terms of Ends, Schopenhauer seems also to derive an account of normalcy
and pathology in keeping with Pathology, though dressed up in the antiquated idiom of political
arrangements within the organism. For instance, in Chapter 20 of WWR II, he contrasts the
“abnormal and pathological” “re ex-movements,” like “stuttering, sobbing, vomiting, so too spasms
and convulsions of all sorts,” to the “normal or physiological” ones, like “respiration” or movement of
“the eyelids in sleep” (WWR II, Ch. 10: 326-7): “Every spasm is a rebellion of the nerves of the member
against the sovereignty of the brain: whereas the normal re ex-movement is the legitimate autocracy of
a subordinate o cial.” On the one hand, both pathological spasms and normal re ex movements16
appear to upset the typical harmony (or agreement) indicative of proper functioning. This comes out
in how these movements contrast to the body’s typical and harmonious response to motives
transmitted through the brain. On the other hand, spasms, unlike normal re exes, are pathological (or
“rebellious”) because, whereas re exes contribute to the confrontation and resistance of hostile forces
in one’s environment (and, so, to survival), spasms disrupt precisely such functions. So, Schopenhauer
implicitly, at least, employs all three central elements of F-Health: Ends, Functions, and Pathology.
Given the plausibility that Nietzsche was aware of F-Health, what impact did it have on how he
conceived of health? In the next two sections, I show that Nietzsche rejects two of its central elements:
Ends and Pathology. Each rejection highlights a central feature of his positive concept of health.
16 My translation based on Schopenhauer (1912 [1844]).
15 Schopenhauer (2010 [1844]), German ed. pagination.
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§3
Nietzsche rejects Ends, as is evident throughout his published works written around 1885 onward.
In uenced by his reading of Maximilian Drossbach, William Rolph, and others, Nietzsche came to
reject the claim that living organisms are naturally directed most basically toward their own survival
and reproduction. He writes in BGE, for instance, that17
Physiologists should reconsider positing the drive for self-maintenance [den
Selbsterhaltungstrieb] as the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all something
living wants to release its strength [Kraft]—life itself is will to power—:
self-maintenance is only one of the indirect and frequent consequences of this. (BGE 13)
While there has been some debate about his precise target in passages like this one, I show in Dunkle18
(2018) that Nietzsche is here rejecting the long prevailing view described above by Ends.
Nietzsche’s reason for rejecting Ends is less clear. Perhaps one aspect of his reasoning is19
suspicion about the implications of Ends when used in a de nition of health (as in F-Health). Being
best suited, mentally and physically, to survive and reproduce is not identical to the sort of mental and
physical condition to which we do or should aspire. As Nietzsche points out in these passages, we have
many other goals in life—including physically and mentally demanding ones—that often compete with
survival and reproduction. So, we should question whether F-Health describes a suitable therapeutic
ideal.
19 This question is ambiguous: Certainly, he says he rejects Ends because he a rms the biological view of “will to
power” and the two views con ict. But I mean to be asking why he a rms the biological view of will to power. As I and
other have argued in the works cited, passages like this one seem merely to parrot controversial  gures like Drossbach.
Nietzsche’s original arguments don’t seem to support the biological view of will to power but rather the psychological view.
18 Loeb (2015); Emden (2014); Johnson (2010); Richardson (2004); Moore (2002).
17 See also GS 349; BGE 36, 259; GM II.12; A 6; TI Skirmishes 14; 1887 11[12], 11[96]; 1888 14[174].
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A decisive defense of Nietzsche’s view here would require a more careful analysis of health and
its relation to welfare than I can pursue now. But consider a couple facts: First, there are many ways in20
which therapeutic medicine might enhance a patient’s health, according to F-Health, and yet render
the patient less well o . Perhaps an athlete's training regimen exposes them to a greater risk of injury or
structural damage down the road. A physician might recommend a change for the sake of their health;
the athlete might well  nd that advice unacceptable predicting a cost in performance. Perhaps another
patient’s fertility is permanently threatened by a medication alleviating her chronic pain. The physician
might recommend a slightly less e ective medication for the sake of her health; the patient may not
want children and  nd the trade-o  unacceptable. In these cases, we may begin to wonder whether the
physician’s recommendations really are health-promoting.
The defender of F-Health could of course argue that these are simply cases of comparing
health-e ects to other e ects on welfare. Notice, however, that sometimes promoting an individual’s
long-term suitedness to realize Ends makes no positive contribution to the patient’s welfare at all. For
example, if the woman above doesn’t want children, then enhancing her fertility doesn’t contribute
positively to her welfare regardless of the cost. Similarly, medical intervention that enables mere organic
survival of a person in, say, an irreversible coma is of no apparent bene t to that person despite
facilitating their realization of the natural end of survival. In a word, survival and reproduction, strictly
speaking, do not appear to be valuable for their own sake. So, if we’re inclined to think
health-promotion is always prima facie welfare-enhancing, we may question F-Health.
Again, the defender of F-Health could just deny that health-promotion is directly
welfare-enhancing. But besides running counter to our common philosophical and ordinary sense that
20 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for calling for greater clarity here.
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being healthy is good for one, this response makes it unclear why medical professionals or society in
general should have the moral obligations to promote health we presume them to have. Finally and
most important to the present discussion, if F-Health can be defended only by denying it has any direct
evaluative implications, then such a notion of health will not be suitable to Nietzsche’s purpose of
utilizing considerations of health in evaluative argumentation. F-Health, therefore, is not suitable for
the purpose to which Nietzsche puts the concept of health.
§4
Nietzsche also rejects Pathology. Speci cally, he rejects that we can generalize the threshold of normal
functional e ciency for a particular system across persons. One clear expression of this rejection is
from GS:21
[T]here is no health in itself, and every attempt to de ne anything of the kind has
turned out an abject failure. In order to determine even what health involves for your
body, what matters is your purpose [Ziel], your horizon, your powers [Kräfte], your
impulses [Antriebe], your errors and in particular the ideals and phantasms of your
soul. [... T]here are countless healths of the body; and, indeed, the more one again
allows the singular and incomparable to raise its head, the more one unlearns the
dogma of the “sameness of people,” the more, therefore, must the concept of a
normality of health [...] be lost to our medical practitioners as well. (GS 120)
Nietzsche’s point here is subtle, and it can be confused with a simpler point about the relativity of
health. That simpler point is that, even if understood functionally, health is multiply realizable. Due to
di erences in body size, for example, my heart may have to pump with somewhat greater (or lesser)
21 See also UM II.1; HH I.286; D 202; BGE 30, 62, 258.
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pressure than my reader’s in order to make the same e ective contribution to my survival over time.
Normality of heart-pumping is, therefore, relative to body size. In this passage, however, Nietzsche
claims that normality is relative to a host of other, non-physical factors including “your purpose, your
horizon, your powers, your impulses [...and] ideals.” One of his own examples is that the ideal
metabolic rate depends upon one’s task or vocation.22
Elsewhere, Nietzsche makes an even stronger claim, that health can be promoted by illness. For
instance, he writes,23
A typically morbid being cannot grow healthy, still less be made healthy; for a typically
healthy person, alternatively, an illness can even be an energetic stimulant for living, for
living more. [...The well-developed person] guesses the cure for impairments; he
exploits bad accidents for his own advantage; what does not kill him, makes him
stronger. (EH Wise 2)
So, someone “typically healthy” (typisch gesund; also “basically healthy,” im Grunde gesund;
“well-developed,” wohlgerathen; elsewhere, possessing “great health” grosse Gesundheit) is not made
unhealthy, and can even be made healthier, by illness. Some commentators have taken this as direct a
statement of Nietzsche’s preferred de nition of health: roughly, as being disposed to reattain health
after the onset of sickness. I don’t think we should follow them, but the reason why is instructive.24
One immediate problem with such a reading is that it apparently leads to the contradictory
predication, is and is not healthy, of someone prior to recovery. That problem is easily dispensed with
24 Huenemann (2013: 68); Leiter (2002: 119); Moore (2002: 122).
23 In fact, EH Clever 2 ends by connecting these two ideas: Nietzsche’s struggles with sickness forced him to
experiment with alternate climes whereby he learned that his intellectual task was better served by a di erence in diet and
climate with corresponding metabolic e ects: “It’s sickness that  rst brought me to reason.” See also HH I P.4-5; HH WS
325; GS 120, 295, 382; 1885 2[97]; BGE 44; 1888 14[157]; EH Wise 1-2; TI Errors 2.
22 EH Clever 2. Cf. BGE 28; TI Errors 1-2.
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by marking the distinction between condition- and trait-health: condition-health represents one’s
current health status, whereas trait-health represents one’s longer-term trend in health. In that sense we
might say, A [trait-]healthy young person is suffering from COVID-19. On this reading, then,
Nietzsche’s remark about typically healthy persons is simply that they exhibit comparatively good
trait-health. But this cannot be all Nietzsche intends when describing himself and others as
well-developed or typically healthy. (Notice, too, that even if it were, it would fall short of a definition
of health.) For one thing, the disposition to recover from illness does not explain why health is relative
to one’s purpose, horizon, powers, impulses, and ideals. Moreover, Nietzsche seems to be after
something more substantive when he claims that those like himself who su er from debilitating and
worsening functional impairment can nonetheless be typically healthy.
Instead of reading typically or basically healthy simply as trait-healthy, I argue that Nietzsche’s
aim is to contrast the implications of his preferred sense of health to those of the received conception,
F-Health. In particular, F-Health implies that functional impairment reduces one’s state of health25
ipso facto: if a functional system operates below a normal level of e ciency, the organism is unhealthy
(to that extent). For instance, I am impaired by seasonal allergies, according to F-Health, because I
breathe abnormally poorly under such circumstances. If we read “impairment” (Schädigung) and
“illness” (Kranksein) in EH Wise 2 this way, then Nietzsche is there endorsing an (as yet unde ned)
conception of health according to which functional impairment does not always imply a reduction in
health. To be typically or basically healthy is compatible with, and can even be enhanced by, functional
impairment.
25 Nietzsche may, in EH Wise 2 (cf. 1888 14[65]), be following Schopenhauer’s distinction between good sickness
(functional and so normal disharmony) and bad sickness (dysfunctional and so abnormal disharmony) touched on in §2.
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Why might Nietzsche think this? The passage quoted from the autobiographical EH comes
amidst an extended description of his own health in 1888 after su ering from headaches, nausea, GI
disturbances, loss of vision, diminishing motor function, and overall debilitating pain for over a
decade. Nietzsche was quite functionally impaired and so unhealthy according to F-Health. He seems
concerned, in passages like this one, to reconcile his condition as he imagines his functionalist posterity
to view it with his own sense that he has actually “turned out well.” Perhaps the pursuit of this
reconciliation is part of what led Nietzsche to challenge the assumption that functional impairment
directly diminishes health.
Nietzsche’s biography to one side, consider an example of someone who, through injury, loses
the full use of their legs. This would unquestionably amount to a functional impairment. And one
would imagine that, for someone who usually enjoys things like walking to work in the mornings and
jogging with her dog in the evening, the injury would diminish her health. But now imagine she grows
accustomed to a wheelchair; over time she becomes adept at commuting to work by chair and bus and
even enjoys it; she gets exercise rolling with her dog in the evenings, and enjoys getting to show it
a ection without bending down. Her functional impairment has not changed, but her health seems to
have.
In this way, Nietzsche’s criticism of F-Health foreshadows one of the current implications of
the disability rights movement for the philosophy of medicine. Most disabilities are traditionally
categorized as conditions that negatively contribute to the disabled person’s health by virtue of the fact
that they represent functional impairments. Disabled persons have forcefully pushed back on what is
often called the “medical model” of disability in recent years partly on grounds that resemble very
closely my reconstruction of Nietzsche’s case: Simply being less functional in some regard does not on
13
its own always impact one’s health (or welfare). A functional de ciency may not detract from their
health in ways typically thought. It may even, more controversially, contribute positively to health. What
is disabling about the impairment is determined as much (or more) by society and environment as
biological function.26
There is, of course, an air of circularity in these arguments, as there were in my supporting
arguments from the prior section. But given the pushback from persons with disabilities and given the
medical implications, it seems hard to maintain F-Health without further argument. As I noted above,
no version of F-Health has yet been proposed that fully explains its core features without making
reference to questionable assumptions about normality. The result of these considerations should be
suspicion of F-Health and an openness to alternative proposals that better account for clinical
medicine and the testimony of disabled persons. In all these ways, Nietzsche is, I argue, an
underappreciated forbearer of some of the conceptual work on health and disability today.
⁕
We’ve seen that Nietzsche rejects a prevailing, then as now, conception of health in terms of the
e ciency with which an organism’s mental and bodily processes function. He rejects F-Health,  rstly,
because it wrongly describes the basic dispositional ends of humans (our ideal mental and bodily state
is not one best directed toward mere survival and reproduction) and, secondly, because it wrongly
implies that functional impairment (i.e. departures below a normal level of functioning within part of
the organism) always contributes negatively to one’s overall health regardless of one’s motivations and
values. These serve as desiderata for an interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of health. In the next two
sections I present further desiderata. Then, I present and defend my own reading.




Nietzsche associates health closely with strength and with enabling one’s basic instincts to express
themselves. These are two important desiderata for interpreting his concept of health. Unfortunately,
prior interpreters tend to focus on one of these points to the exclusion of the other. I start in this
section with strength.
Nietzsche frequently describes strength (Stärke, Kraft, Macht) as a requirement of health, and
weakness (Schwäche) as entailing sickness. For instance, in A he writes,27
Through pity, that loss of strength [Kraft] which su ering in itself already brings to life
increases and is reproduced. Su ering itself becomes contagious through pity. [...]
Nothing is less healthy within our unhealthy modernity than Christian pity. (A 7)
Pity is unhealthy because pity causes weakness. But Nietzsche can seem to take the relation of strength
to health further than a causal one, as he often also describes health as a requirement for strength.
Consider this passage:28
Physiologically speaking: in the struggle with the beast, making sick [Krankmachen]
can be the sole means of making it weak. The church understood this: it corrupted
humanity so it could weaken it. (TI Improvers 2)
If there is, for Nietzsche, a mutual entailment between weakness and sickness, strength and health,
respectively, then it would seem natural to suppose that in each pair, the former is identical to the
latter.
28 See also TI Skirmishes 45; Z I Criminal.
27 See also UM II.1; HH I.224; D 42, 68.
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Strength cannot be identical to health for Nietzsche, however, nor weakness to sickness. First,
in the same works Nietzsche opposes health and strength, sickness and weakness, as in the following:29
We hold [the human] to be the strongest animal [das stärkste Thier] because it is the
most cunning: a consequence of this is its spirituality. [… But t]he human is
proportionally the worst-developed animal, the sickliest, the one most dangerously
astray from its instincts [das missrathenste Thier, das krankhafteste, das von seinen
Instinkten am gefährlichste<n> abgeirrte]. (A 14)
If humans are both the strongest and the sickliest animals, then strength cannot be identical to health.
Second, notice that Nietzsche claims here that our sickliness is a function of our having strayed from
our instincts. I discuss this further below (§6).
Finally, identifying health with strength would seem to go back on his rejection of Pathology
from F-Health. What is strength but a dispositional feature of an organism to realize some quanti able
behavioral outcome to which it endeavors (e.g. the tendency to lift weight of a given magnitude when
trying)? Presumably such a dispositional feature supervenes on the combined, interactive e ect of the
e ciency of the organism’s functional systems. If so, one’s strength(s) just are complex products of the
e ciency of functional systems. In such a case, to be stronger than someone else in some regard (e.g
lifting weight) just is to have greater e ciency in certain functional systems (vis-à-vis weight-lifting).
But in that case, if to be stronger is to be healthier, then Nietzsche’s claim, from GS 120 and elsewhere,
would be false: functioning more e ciently in some regard would make a direct contribution to one’s
health irrespective of one’s purpose, horizon, powers, impulses, and ideals. Nietzsche’s circulatory,
29 Cf. GM III.13.
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digestive, visual, and mobility impairments would each directly undermine his claim to health. So,
while strength is conceptually tied to health for Nietzsche, the two are not to be identi ed.
§6
Nietzsche relates health not only to strength but also to certain motivational states: he says that being
so comported as “to satisfy” (erfüllen) or to realize a “coordination” (Coordination) among one’s
“instincts” (Instinkte), “drives” (Triebe), or “passions” (Passion, Leidenschaften) is healthful or healthy.
By contrast he says states of “anarchy” (Anarchismus, Anarchie), “inhibition” (Hemmung),
“disruption” (Störung), and “disgregation” of such are pathogenic or pathological.30
In light of these claims, many reconstruct Nietzsche’s notion of health solely in terms of one’s
motivational condition. Richardson (2009), for instance, de nes health for Nietzsche as a functional
unity among one’s drives. He suggests that we view human psychology in terms of drives forming31
vectors of behavioral dispositions which can, in instances, con ict with one another and, in other
instances, e ect a stronger combined disposition. The result is a constantly  uctuating psychic “power
structure.” A person is healthy, on Richardson’s reading, speci cally when they are disposed to
maintain or achieve an overall functional unity among that power structure: “A healthy organism is
simply a set of drives that is able to settle into such a stable structure” (2009: 135). Further, Richardson
argues that the organism requires an organizing principle in order to achieve this functional unity,
which principle can be identi ed with a particular “strong” or “ruling” drive(s).
Because Richardson’s reconstruction of Nietzschean health does not specify which functions
the organism needs to be organized around, it coheres with Nietzsche’s rejection of Ends in F-Health.
31 Cf. Reginster (2013), whose reading faces similar objections.
30 BGE  208, 258; TI Morality 1-4; TI Errors 2; TI Germans 6; TI Skirmishes 35, 45; 1888 14[157]. Cf. 1874
32[20]; 1880 6[110]; GM II.16.
17
And because functional unity is a formal criterion—a kind of coherence among the e ects of one’s
basic motivational states—this account also  ts Nietzsche’s rejection of the idea that a particular level
of e ciency with respect to some function or other could determine one’s health-status. As
Huddleston (2017) points out, however, this cannot be “the whole story” of Nietzsche’s conception of
health. Possessing a unifying, strong drive is not su cient for comparatively good health on
Nietzsche’s view. Huddleston points to Nietzsche’s discussion of various persons who possess such
strong drives and are functionally unified but who are nonetheless quite sick on Nietzsche’s view. I32
am also skeptical that a speci cally a strong drive is necessary for good health, but I won’t insist on this
in what follows.33
So, while functional unity does characterize good health, such that functional disunity
amounts to poor health, functional unity alone is not su cient. We have identi ed another
characteristic but not a de nition of health for Nietzsche. I turn now to my proposed reading.
§7
Here are the interpretive desiderata argued for so far:
(¬Ends) Nietzsche rejects the basis of F-Health: that organisms are most
fundamentally disposed toward survival and reproduction (§3);
33 In the very notebook passage (1888 14[157]) routinely cited in support of views like Richardson’s, Nietzsche
distinguishes a (periodically) healthy condition consisting in coincidental order among one’s drives from that consisting in
the presence of a strong, unifying drive. He distinguishes both healthy states to that of complete disorder among one’s
drives. Creasy (2020: 113) argues that this periodically healthy condition is just periodic attainment of a strong or ruling
drive. But I question this as Nietzsche explicitly describes those drives as “beside-one-another without being [...]
for-one-another.” It seems to me that he is imagining that our drives might just happen to converge in the behavioral
dispositions they produce, periodically, and so cooperate for a time without maintaining any kind of stable unity. I don’t
thinks this a ects Creasy’s purposes (which do not include reconstructing a general account of health). But it does suggest
that health does not require a strong or ruling drive.
32 Huddleston discusses Wagner and the Wagnerites in CW and Socrates in TI Socrates who all possess strong
drives but are paragons of illness.
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(¬Pathology) Nietzsche denies that functional impairment always and directly
contributes negatively to one’s health (§4);
(Healthfully Ill) Nietzsche holds that functional impairments can contribute
positively to one’s trait-health (§4);
(Strength) Nietzsche closely relates the concepts of health to strength, and sickness to
weakness (§5);
(Unity) Nietzsche holds that coherence among one’s motivational dispositions
contributes to (even though it doesn’t su ce for) health and that such coherence can,
but needn’t, be realized through the presence of a strong or dominant drive (§6);
(Criterial) Nietzsche appeals to e ects on health in order to recommend that we reject
conventional morality (§1).
How are we to meet all these desiderata?
I argue that, by the late 1880s, Nietzsche employs the following concept of health, which
closely resembles a view currently defended in the philosophy of medicine (albeit by the minority):34
(N-Health) A person (S) is healthy in her circumstance (C) to the extent that S has the
ability in C to meet the demands of S’s motivational landscape;
(Motivations) The demands of S’s motivational landscape are a function of the
resistance met by S in behaving the way S is disposed to by virtue of her drives;
(Ability) S has the ability to overcome a resistance (R) of degree x in C i  S is disposed
to overcome R(x), such that S tends to overcome R(x) when S is motivated to confront
R and does confront R(x).
34 Nordenfelt (2013a, 2013b, 2007, 2004, 1995); Venkatapuram (2013); Richman (2004). As with my
presentation of F-Health, my presentation of N-Health is in uenced by this literature.
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As with F-Health, N-Health is comparative: health comes in degrees. On N-Health, one is healthy to
the extent that one is able to overcome resistance met in acting on one’s motivations. There are at least
three ways degree of health can vary. First, since resistance comes in degrees, so, too, will health. I may35
not be able to concentrate quite as long as I want on a paper, but being able to concentrate for an hour
indicates greater health than being able to concentrate only for a moment given my motivation to read
the paper. (I take it that this is roughly what we mean when we say one is “more able” to do
such-and-such a task: that one is able to complete the task in the presence of greater resistance.) Second,
people’s motivations are typically manifold. Our motivations often con ict. And even when they
converge (when one realizes the sort of unity discussed above), they dispose us toward composite
activities consisting in many component parts. To be able to realize many but not all of those
component parts is to be healthier than to be unable to realize any, even though both states predict
failure. Finally and as with F-Health, we can distinguish condition- from trait-N-health. One’s
motivations and abilities, obviously,  uctuate in predictable ways over time even without signi cant
changes in oneself of context. Accordingly, there will be many separate axes of one’s trait-N-health and,
consequently, many possible degrees of trait-N-health.
N-Health agrees with F-Health on simple cases like nasal congestion: whatever one’s
motivations, these will invariably require the ability to breathe at least moderately well. And so, severe
nasal congestion will undermine one’s health. N-Health disagrees with F-Health on the other cases
touched on above. When assessing the contribution an athlete’s training program makes to their
health, the distinctive motivations they have as an athlete are part of the equation. Whether someone is
motivated to have children is directly relevant to determining whether fertility treatment will enhance
35 I am very appreciative to an anonymous reviewer for requesting this discussion.
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their health. Similarly, our happy and mobile paraplegic may well have reattained a state of health,
according to N-Health, by virtue of her now being able to overcome the resistance she meets to
realizing her motivations even though she has hardly regained the functional capacity her legs once
had.
A fuller discussion of these points than can be pursued in this paper would consider more
carefully the distinctive features of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology. But even without doing so36
it’s easy to see how N-Health accounts for several of the interpretive points summarized above. First,
since health is a function, roughly, of one’s strength or ability to express one’s drives, N-Health
captures Nietzsche’s rejection of Ends and Pathology in F-Health. The basic, natural ends of organisms
do not set the standard according to which one’s physiological functions are to be assessed; rather one’s
global motivational disposition does. Hence ¬Ends. For that same reason, whether a particular
functional impairment impacts one’s health depends upon how it impacts one’s overall ability to
realize those ends one is motivated toward. Hence ¬Pathology. N-Health also clearly captures Strength
since one’s abilities partly constitute one’s health-status. Merely exhibiting a functional impairment
does not itself make one ill; illness results only if one’s impairment a ects one’s ability to realize the
ends one is motivated toward.
This much explains how N-Health makes it possible for Nietzsche to claim good health for
himself despite several impairments. But it doesn’t yet explain (Healthfully Ill) how these impairments
can actually promote his health. It would seem that, if one’s health is determined by one’s ability to
realize one’s motivations, then being more capable (i.e. able to overcome greater resistance) is always
potentially healthful and never pathological. Conversely, wouldn’t being less capable (able to overcome
36 Katsafanas (2016) is an insightful place to start.
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less) always be potentially pathological and never potentially healthful? And what is an impairment but
such a reduction in capability?
To address this, consider  rst how N-Health explains Unity. To be healthy is, roughly, to be
able to realize the ends one is motivated toward. But what happens if one’s motivations push one in
con icting directions? This happens when, to use Nietzsche’s example, the socialization of a barbarian
people has the e ect of repressing some of their aggressive drives by means of those other drives tied to
social cohesion and obedience. Nietzsche thinks that the repressed drive will slowly lead to complex37
new behaviors. But prior to that resolution is a condition of disunity or incoherence among one’s
motivational dispositions where the person is unable to express them all. That inability detracts from
one’s health according to N-Health. Thus, motivational incoherence contributes negatively to health
on N-Health. Moreover, a certain level of unity beyond mere coherence (such as that facilitated by a
“dominating” drive which has the e ect of consolidating vectors into a small number of behavioral
ends) will tend to contribute positively to health insofar as it enhances the person’s overall ability to
meet the total demands of their drives. Again, I am avoiding a subtler discussion of drives for want of
space. But we have a broad outline of how N-Health captures Unity.
Now return to Healthfully Ill. How can a functional impairment have the e ect of promoting
one’s overall ability to meet the demands of one’s motivations? What makes this possibility sound so
counterintuitive is that we tend to focus on promoting health by way of enhancing relevant strengths
or abilities. But as the discussion of Unity shows, one’s health can also be promoted through
psychological changes, according to N-Health, whereby one’s motivations become more easily realized
individually and as a set. Below (§9) I discuss three general and interrelated ways impairments can
37 GM II.16.
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enhance health for Nietzsche. But  rst I meet a challenge to my approach recently presented by
Huddleston (2017).
§8
Huddleston (2017) argues that we should not read Nietzsche as conceiving of health in “formal or
dynamic” terms but instead read health as irreducibly evaluative. He points to passages, like EH Wise
2, where Nietzsche characterizes himself as “basically healthy.” Nietzsche’s “proof” is that he
“instinctively select[s] always the right means against bad conditions [schlimmen Zustände].”
Huddleston argues that this characterization of health implies an irreducibly evaluative element:
What makes this characteristic [i.e. selecting the right means against bad conditions]
obtain is partly a normative property: the fact that the course of action one is desiring
and performing is actually good for one. […H]ow, if we refused to make recourse to
any normative notions, could we ever identify this characteristic? In order to do so, we
would need to consider not just descriptive facts about what the person does desire, but
make a judgment about what he should desire. (Huddleston 2017: 153)
So, we should read health as irreducibly evaluative for Nietzsche because that is supposedly the only
way to make sense of passages like EH Wise 2. I worry, however, that this reading fails to explain
Nietzsche’s rejection of F-Health and that it undermines the argumentative role Nietzsche gives health
in GM. More importantly, reading health as evaluative is not the only way to make sense of38
Nietzsche’s claims: N-Health presents an alternative and a richer one.
38 In a word, I think Nietzsche appeals to impacts on our health in order to ground his criticism of morality in
matters of current concern to us. Reading health as an idiosyncratic norm makes his criticism dependent upon further
argument that we should care about that norm. It’s di cult to locate any such argument in Nietzsche. Reading health as a
literal description of our medical state obviates that worry.
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I suggest that the sense in which persons who are basically healthy instinctively choose what is
good for them—in Nietzsche’s words, “the right means against bad conditions,” “the cure for
impairments”—just is the sense in which they are motivationally disposed so as to maintain (or
recover) their health across time and changing circumstances. “Right” or “curative” should be read as
conducive to health. Huddleston seems to be concerned that this reading would result in a circular
de nition: someone is (1) basically healthy if they tend to maintain or restore their (2) health across
time. Clearly, if 2 is de ned in terms of 1, then the de nition is problematically circular. But in my
view 2 should not be de ned in terms of 1, and, just as important, Nietzsche’s claim here is not a
de nition but a causal explanation. As I argued above (§4), Nietzsche is claiming that he himself
exhibits genuine trait-health despite his functional impairments. To be healthy is not, as most think, to
be free of functional impairments. Functional impairments can detract from one’s health, but they can
also not detract or even promote one’s health. A marker of someone (1) superlatively trait-healthy is
that they somehow, and not necessarily consciously, take advantage of these impairments for their
overall health at least in the long run. Thus, Nietzsche is purportedly (1) basically healthy at least in
part because he (2) adapts well to functional impairments. What it means to be superlatively
trait-healthy is not de ned by this marker, but in a world where we all face various functional
impairments, exhibiting trait-health will require overcoming these. So, this marker is characteristic.
Therefore, the puzzling claims Nietzsche makes, which Huddleston thinks implies an
evaluative conception of health, can be explained by reading his concept of health as N-Health. I have
only described this explanation abstractly thus far. I turn to consider why Nietzsche thinks that
struggling with and overcoming impairments can enhance one’s health in more detail.
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§9
In this section I sketch three ways Nietzsche identi es in which functional impairments can enhance
our health. First, it can enhance self-understanding. Second, it can alter our motivational landscape.
And third, it can provide con dence or hope that buoys us in our continued endeavors. Through these
interacting means, impairments can render us more able to realize our motivations over time.
Struggling with functional impairments, Nietzsche observes, can teach us a lot about ourselves.
And the self-understanding we gain can guide the projects we take on, can call our attention toward
those of our weaknesses that can be improved, and can inform e ective strategies for doing so. In these
ways, impairments can contribute self-understanding useful in enhancing our trait-health. Nietzsche
makes these points repeatedly when extolling the virtues of “convalescence.” But they may not be
obvious because Nietzsche usually makes them in the context of expressing the distinctly philosophical
insight a orded him through overcoming impairment. For instance in his 1886 preface to GS he
writes,39
A psychologist knows few questions as attractive as that of the relation between health
and philosophy, and, in the event that she grows ill herself, she brings her whole
scienti c curiosity to the sickness within her. […] After this sort of self-questioning,
self-tempting, one learns to look with a  ner eye at everything that has generally been
philosophizing up till now. (P.2)
Nietzsche sees his struggles with impairments as granting him philosophical insight because it prompts
self-re ection and leads to enhanced self-understanding. Put in terms of N-Health, such
39 See also HH I P.5; HH II P.4-5, HH II.356; D 114; GS P.2; GS 120; EH Wise 1-2.
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self-understanding can promote our health by inter alia informing our motivations, how we pursue
our goals in light of understanding our own current and potential future abilities.
Impairments can contribute to our trait-health, according to Nietzsche, not only through
enhancing our self-understanding but also through altering our motivational landscape—changing
how we are disposed to feel about things and our motivation to pursue particular ends. In GS, for
instance, Nietzsche expresses gratitude toward his severe bouts of illness “because they allow [him] a
hundred backdoors by which [he] can escape [his] enduring habits” (GS 295). By disrupting our
patterns of behavior, impairments can make room for establishing a healthier motivational landscape.
As with the bene ts of self-understanding, this would require discipline on the part of the impaired;
there’s no reason to think these impacts would automatically be bene cial. But by impacting, even
temporarily, our motivational patterns, they can provide an opportunity for healthful change.
Nietzsche’s claim that impairment can shake up our motivations and enable a healthier way of
life is not wholly idiosyncratic: it is appreciated by those who work with chronic disease. Here’s how a
psychologist who specializes in treating cancer patients puts the point:
Paradoxically, while serious illness often forces people to re-evaluate their implicit
aspirations and assumptions about the future, causing loss, disillusionment and
uncertainty, this process of re ection and re-evaluation can sometimes be helpful to
personal development (health-enhancing). The assumptions and values people hold
may not always be in their best interest, in fact they may be inconsistent with the life
they had planned to have and the person they wanted to be. (Brennan 2013: 141)
Serious illness can promote our health, understood in terms of N-Health, by altering, in part directly
and in part by inspiring re ection upon, our future goals and values. Not only can this help us cope
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with impaired abilities; it can also prompt re ection on the coherence of our goals and values with our
persisting abilities, thus promoting health beyond adaptation to impairment.
Finally, Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes that the process of becoming impaired (“falling ill”)
and reattaining health through the means just touched on (“convalescing”) can enhance our health
further still by increasing our hope in our own dispositional abilities—the abilities we may not
currently possess but that we might some day. (Hence why Nietzsche calls this a hope rather an
assurance in our current strength or power.)
Here is one of Nietzsche’s more evocative discussions of the hope that follows convalescence
from his 1886 preface to GS:40
Gratitude pours out of us continually as though the most unexpected had occurred,
the gratitude of the convalescent,—because convalescence was that which was most
unexpected. “Gay science”: this means the Saturnalia of spirit, which has patiently
resisted a frightful lengthy pressure—patient, strong, cold, without submitting, but
without hope—, which now, all in an instant, is attacked by hope, by the hope of
health, by the drunkenness of convalescence [...], the cheerfulness of recurring strength
[das Frohlocken der wiederkehrenden Kraft], the newly awakened belief in a tomorrow
and the next day, the sudden feeling and premonition of the future, of a nearby
adventure, of a sea opening again, of an aim once again allowed, once again believed.
(GS P.1)
Convalescing brings hope and cheerfulness in our “recurring strength” which allows us once again to
seize and to trust in an aim. That is, the hope of seeing our strength grow provides the con dence that
40 See also HH I P; HH II P; EH Wise.
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we can in the future meet currently insurmountable challenges. And it’s precisely such hope that is
required for the pursuit of the most di cult tasks the paths to success in which we cannot yet identify.
Nietzsche repeatedly uses the metaphor of venturing out over a vast, open sea to capture the condition
of the ambitious philosopher who, like himself, sets his sights on tasks too challenging to have a
justi ed belief in their ability to accomplish. This is why, in his famous discussion of “the great health”
from GS 382, he describes his “Argonauts of ideals” as in need of a “a health that one not only has but
also still continually attains [erwirbt] and must attain because one relinquishes [preisgiebt] it again and
again and must relinquish it!” What they need is hope in their own capacity to grow stronger with
respect to their yet-un nished, yet-un nishable task of revaluing values.
So, “sickness” or impairment can prompt self-re ection and lead to self-understanding; it can
disrupt our habitual motivations and behavior allowing for change; and upon “convalescence” it can
instill a hope in a yet-unproven ability to reattain health in the face of future setbacks. In these
interacting ways, impairment can, through self-re ection, -discipline, and a bit of luck, actually
enhance our health.
§10
The foregoing is only a sketch of how to interpret Nietzsche on Healthfully Ill. But it’s enough to
grasp his strategy, in EH Wise 2, of reconciling the judgment he expects others to make of his
health—viz, that it’s remarkably poor—with his own sense that it’s basically good.
Nietzsche does not grant that his various impairments always detract from his overall health.
That’s because the impairments are understood functionally by him, whereas the measure of health he
employs (N-Health) is relative to one’s motivational landscape and not simply the functions attributed
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to humans by virtue of our supposed natural ends. Moreover, Nietzsche grants that his impairments
have, at times, rendered him ill even according to N-Health: when he is rendered virtually blind, he is
less able to read, etc. His claim to basic health is a claim to trait-health: he believes he is disposed, over
time, to recover or convalesce from the pathological e ects of his impairments even though he may well
not regain functional normalcy. The reason for his optimism—its “proof” as he says—is that he is
disposed (presumably, has learned) to take advantage of his impairments in at least the three ways just
described: as a means to self-understanding, motivational change, and hope in the future
(re)acquisition of strength.
It’s worth touching, brie y, on how this picture, resonates with positions in disability studies.
Disability advocates rightly complain that disabilities are categorically de ned as health- and
welfare-detracting (which isn’t to say that no disability can be). But as Barnes (2016) observes, there is a
danger in advocating for the opposite, equally cartoonish picture, what she calls the “X-men theory of
disability,” according to which disabilities always come with health-/welfare- bene ts outweighing their
harms. Barnes herself argues that disabilities, as a class (though perhaps not in every instance), are not
harmful in themselves, though they can be just as they can be bene cial depending upon further facts
about the role they play in individual lives.
Reading Nietzsche to combine N-Health with the description from §9 of the contingent
bene ts of functional impairments, amounts to a similar picture. Whether any particular impairment
does or does not detract from one’s health, for Nietzsche, depends upon facts about one’s motivational
landscape. Perhaps some conditions, their symptoms, or their comorbidities will typically or even
always detract from health given shared human motivational features. But this is not a given.
Moreover, impairments can be bene cial for one’s health in the ways discussed above, but not as a
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matter of necessity and not without a great deal of work on the individual’s part. In this way, those
bene ts seized from an impairment can be attributed, in part at least, to the agency of the bene ciary
rather than to the fates of the Marvel universe.
⁕
I have argued for a reading of Nietzsche’s concept of health as the overall ability to meet the demands
of one’s motivational landscape. I have shown that, unlike other interpretations, this reading accounts
for his rejection of particular features of the functionalist conception of health, his association of
health with strength and with psychic unity, and his claim that superlative health is compatible with,
and can even be enhanced by, impairments such as those from which he personally su ered. I have also
drawn connections between Nietzsche and recent literature on health and disability. This reading
should enable a clearer and more insightful reconstruction of Nietzsche’s criticism of conventional
morality and his broader evaluative project.
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